# Security fixes for rdiff-backup v2.2

**URL:** <https://minarca.discourse.group/t/security-fixes-for-rdiff-backup-v2-2/27>\
**Category:** Release Announcements\
**Created:** [October 20, 2026, 5:24pm UTC](https://minarca.discourse.group/t/security-fixes-for-rdiff-backup-v2-2/27 "2026-10-20T17:24:09Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![ikus060](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex047/user_avatar/minarca.discourse.group/ikus060/32/28_2.png) [@ikus060](https://minarca.discourse.group/u/ikus060)\
**Post date:** [October 20, 2026, 5:24pm UTC](https://minarca.discourse.group/t/security-fixes-for-rdiff-backup-v2-2/27/1 "2026-10-20T17:24:09Z")

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An important security fix is now available for minarca-server. This new version v2.2.6-13 include a backported patch to fix an important vulnerability in rdiff-backup server.

This was reported by Jeff Tong [https://github.com/Wind010](https://github.com/Wind010).

The CVE is not yet available, but it’s on the way.

Here a short summary:

1. **What:** `rdiff-backup --server` (v2.2.6) calls `pickle.loads()` on attacker-controlled data, with no restrictions on what can be deserialized.
2. **Exploit:** Anyone who can write to the server’s stdin can send a crafted frame containing a pickle payload (via ` __reduce__ `) and run arbitrary code as the server’s user.
3. **Impact:** Mainly local privilege escalation to root where `--server` is allowed through. It would be remote code execution if the pipe were reachable across a trust boundary.

For minarca-server, this is limited to a local privilege escalation to minarca user (not root) because to addition sandboxing implemented directly in minarca-server, exactly to mitigate this kind of vulnerability.